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Sammendrag 
Av ulike grunner kan oljeselskapenes avkastningskrav være høyere i dag enn bare for noen år siden. 
På grunn av lavere oljepriser har flere selskap flyttet til petroleumsprovinser der ressursene kan hentes 
opp relativt raskt. Oljebransjen ser også ut til å ha vært gjennom et skifte fra volum til verdi, dvs. at 
selskapene i dag fokuserer mer på prosjekter som gir høy avkastning i stedet for høyt produksjons-
volum. I tillegg kan oljeselskapene ha blitt stadig mer urolige for at deler av deres verdier kan bli 
"strandet" eller verdiløse, hvis flere land innfører strengere tiltak for å motvirke global oppvarming. 
Dette kan også føre til at man i større grad fokuserer mer på kortsiktig inntjening og dermed har 
høyere avkastningskrav enn tidligere. 
 
Ved å anvende ulike avkastningskrav og ulike oljeprisbaner ser denne studien på fremtidig norsk 
petroleumsproduksjon, investeringer og skatteinntekter fra 2018 til 2050. Et viktig kjennetegn ved det 
norske petroleumsskattesystemet er at staten i praksis finansierer en stor andel av oljeselskapenes 
investeringer på grunn av høy nettoskatt og gunstige fradragsmuligheter. En konsekvens av dette er at 
på kort sikt øker skatteinngangen når investeringene blir mindre. Det vil dessuten ta relativt lang tid 
før reduserte investeringer gir vesentlig lavere produksjon og dermed lavere skatteinntekter. 
 
Jeg viser at stigende avkastningskrav i liten grad vil påvirke nåverdien av statens skatteinntekter. 
Hovedårsaken er at når avkastningskravet stiger vil investering og kapitalutgifter være lavere i en 
innledende periode, og dette gjør at fradragene blir mindre og skatteinntektene større. Lavere 
investeringer vil kun ha en gradvis negativ effekt på fremtidig produksjon på grunn av lange ledetider 
og slik sett på sikt påvirke statens inntekter negativt. I tillegg gjør et høyere avkastningskrav det 
lønnsomt for oljeselskapene å utsette noen av investeringene, og dette vil isolert sett hindre fremtidig 
produksjon fra å avta enda mer. Selv om lavere produksjon gradvis har en negativ innvirkning på de 
totale skatteinntektene, oppveies dette av den positive effekten på inntektene fra lavere investeringer i 
den innledende perioden. 
 
Jeg viser videre at med en relativ lav oljepris vil høyere avkastningskrav være klart gunstig for 
myndighetene. Årsaken er at den positive effekten på skatteinntektene av reduserte investeringer i den 
innledende perioden mer enn oppveier den påfølgende negative effekten fra lavere produksjon. Disse 
resultatene støttes av følsomhetsberegninger.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper looks at the effects on the governmentʼs tax take of an assumed rising required rate of 
return (RRR) in the petroleum sector. There are various reasons why the RRR (or the discount rate) for 
the oil companies may be higher today than only some years ago. First, since the price drop in 2014 
many oil majors have moved from high-cost undeveloped resources to lower-cost areas where 
resources can be brought on relatively quickly (PIW, 2018). There have also been changes in the types 
of projects that are executed. Companies increasingly focus on projects that deliver high rates of return 
rather than high reserve volumes (IEA, 2017a). There has also been a shift towards projects with 
shorter investment cycles. The clearest example of this is investment in light tight oil reserves, but also 
in conventional crude oil projects with shorter time lags, i.e. lags between development approval and 
production (IEA, 2017b). This may result in higher RRR in provinces with long lead times like the 
Norwegian continental shelf (NCS). According to the Financial Times (2018a) the oil majors have to a 
certain degree moved back into high-cost and high-risk areas, due to the increase in oil price from 
early 2015 to 2018. However, it is still emphasized that the industry seems to drill fewer and better 
wells in commercially attractive areas than before, meaning that high returns are preferred over high 
volumes. 
 
A second trend is the rising awareness within the business community of climate risk to the economy 
(Carbon Tracker, 2017). Future investment opportunities can consist of assets that might be 
undeveloped. Oil companies (and energy companies in general) are under scrutiny from investors 
about the impact of climate policies on their future earnings. Pension funds globally have increasingly 
begun pulling out of fossil fuel companies over fears that their assets could become “stranded”, or 
worthless, if governments across the world introduce stricter rules to tackle global warming (Financial 
Times, 2018b). This can lead to more near-sighted investment strategies and hence, a higher RRR. 
 
A possible threat to the future oil demand is that the cost of electric vehicles (EV) is expected to be at 
par with the cost of cars with internal combustion engines, according to Randall (2016) by as soon as 
2022. The largest emerging economies China and India have signalled high ambitions for EV 
(Reuters, 2017) and car producers have pledged to end production of cars with only internal 
combustion engines (The Guardian 2017a, b). Once electrification of transport takes hold, why should 
it stop at cars? Technological breakthroughs in battery technology could also reduce the oil demand 
from trucks, ships and aircrafts. In addition, the petrochemicals sector is vulnerable to environmental 
concerns as an emerging “war on plastics” is taking place (Energy Intelligence, 2018). This could also 
lead to reduced demand for oil, thus raising the uncertainty about the prospects of oil suppliers. It must 
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be emphasized that some of the effects described above is linked to an environment of both higher 
RRR for the oil companies as well as lower future oil prices. 
 
There are different opinions on the appropriate RRR to apply in petroleum analyses. The rate of return 
shall reflect the return of capital in the best alternative use, while the oil company at the same time is 
compensated for taking risk. Hence, the real rate of return is the risk-free rate plus a risk premium 
(because it may not be possible to diversify the risk). The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has set 
the discount rate in petroleum projects to be 7 per cent (Riksrevisjonen, 2015). Based on the 
discussion above, this study analysis the effects of higher (real) RRR for producers outside OPEC. Oil 
companies often apply a real discount rate of 10 per cent in their cash-flow analyses. This is seen as an 
average RRR or a “rule of thumb” in the industry (Harden, 2014). Wood Mackenzie considers the 
standard industry benchmark for the internal rate of return for a robust project to be around 15 per cent 
or even somewhat higher (Upstream, 2016). Hence, this study looks at the effects of increasing the 
RRR from 7 per cent to 10, 15 and 20 per cent. 
 
Many analysts argue that it may prove beneficial for the government to carry a large fraction of the in-
itial investment to secure higher tax revenue later in the project life cycle (e.g. Osmundsen et al, 
2017). Summers (1987) argues that when the governments weigh present revenue against future in-
come, they must consider that companies use a substantially higher discount rate, and he concludes 
that governments would win by introducing accelerated depreciation. I contribute to the discussion by 
showing how rising RRR affects the tax income on the NCS, which can be described as an oil prov-
ince with favourable deductions of capital expenses and a high net tax rate. This entails that a large 
part of the revenue is collected by the government when the projects are profitable. When RRR rises 
fewer of the high costs reserves are profitable to develop and investment declines. Because the govern-
ment indirectly carries a large fraction of the investments, less investment in a period increases the tax 
base and the tax income. This initial effect is offset by a subsequent reduction in production which has 
a negative effect on future taxes. Hence, the result is only marginal changes in the net present value 
(NPV) of total tax take in the various RRR scenarios. I also show that with a low oil price the tax reve-
nue increases significantly when RRR rises. 
 
Oil prices are of course important for the profitability of investments. Oil prices over 100 USD per 
barrel in the period 2011-14 brought about large increases in supply from Non-OPEC producers and 
consequently oil prices fell sharply in 2014. Following reductions in production in both OPEC and 
some Non-OPEC countries, the oil price is higher today than in the beginning of 2015. How changes 
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in the RRR will affect future investment, production and total tax revenue in an oil province will 
clearly vary with the oil price level. Therefore, this study applies three oil price scenarios based on 
IEA (2017a). This is a high, a middle (reference) and a low oil price trajectory, which will be 
described later. 
 
With this point of departure, I analyse how future Norwegian oil production and investment might 
develop. This study seeks to answer the following questions: 
• How robust is supply and investment to future oil price development? 
• How will variations in RRR affect investment and production under different oil price as-
sumptions? 
• What will be the effects on the government̕ s tax take? 
 
To answer these questions, this study applies a comprehensive and transparent global oil model with 
prices, costs and reserves. An important contribution of the paper is the detailed modelling of the 
supply side. Oil producers base their investment and production decisions on profit maximization and 
detailed information about the access to fields worldwide. The producers might invest in new reserves, 
which are both new fields and increased oil recovery from existing fields. The assumption that 
investments first target the most profitable reserves leads to a geographical spread of oil extraction 
worldwide. Gradually less profitable resources are developed until the internal rate of return is equal to 
the RRR.  
 
Many studies on resource taxation do not deal with the complete tax system of a country, but on more 
partial and often theoretical effects of taxes. Lund (2009) surveys distortionary effects of taxation on 
investment and extraction in the nonrenewable resource sector, under different assumptions regarding 
company behaviour. He searches for an optimal tax policy when uncertainty is taken into 
consideration. Smith (2013) surveys different studies on taxation in general and presents the strengths 
and limitations of different framework modelling regarding resource taxation. He emphasizes that 
anticipating the taxpayer's behavioural response is primarily what economic analyses add to the 
accounting discussion of tax policy. Kemp and Stephen (2017) disregard taxes, but look at how 
different rates of return (discount rates) affect investment and production on various undeveloped 
fields on the UK continental shelf. They apply Monte Carlo techniques on data for fields size, 
development and operational costs over two exogenous future oil (and gas) prices. Contrary to us, they 
do not apply a model where the oil companies base their investment and production decisions on 
profitability. Among empirical studies of oil taxation, Berg et al (2018) look at various planned 
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Norwegian petroleum fields and study to what extent a lower uplift will make the shareholders reduce 
investment and production. The authors only apply a given discount rate of 8 per cent. In line with my 
approach, Helmi-Oskoui et al (1992) assume that the oil producers maximize the present value of 
profits. They look at a given reservoir in the U.S. and study how different discount rates affect 
production and investment. The model output is not only the number of wells, but also their location. 
However, the result does not seem credible as a lower discount rate will make the operator postpone 
any development for 17 years followed by only three years of extraction. In addition, like Kemp and 
Stephen (2017) and Berg et al (2018), they do not explore the effects on petroleum tax payment, which 
is the focus of my study. Further, I have not been able to find studies that analyse effects on the total 
tax revenue in an oil province in a global environment. Many empirical studies focus on specific 
characteristics of oil tax systems in an isolated country, e.g. Mansour and Nakhle (2016) that surveys 
fiscal stabilization in oil and gas contracts in 20 countries. This means that they cannot take into 
consideration e.g. a possible tax competition between countries in the form of redirection of 
investments to a more favourable investment environment. 
 
The next section describes the numerical oil market model, which is called FRISBEE. I present 
simulations of different scenarios towards 2050 present in Section 3. In Section 4 the sensitivity 
analyses are discussed, and I conclude in Section 5. 
2. Model description 
The FRISBEE1 model is a partial equilibrium model of the global oil market, which is recursively 
dynamic, i.e. the model is solved in sequential periods, and equilibrium within each period depends 
only on past and contemporaneous variables. Other versions of the model also include global gas, coal, 
and electricity markets. In the present version the world is divided into 16 regions, including Norway, 
where oil companies produce oil. The time periods in the model are one year and the base year is 
2012. Prices are thus stated in year 2012-USD and exchange rates are held constant over time. The 
world market price of oil is exogenous, but different price scenarios are considered. OPEC satisfies the 
residual demand at the prevailing oil price, determined as the difference between world demand and 
Non-OPEC supply. The fixed price assumption implies that demand and Non-OPEC supply are 
determined independently of each other. Therefore, the model description will focus on the supply side 
of Non-OPEC in general and of Norway in particular2. The present model version has three different 
                                                     
1 FRISBEE: Framework of International Strategic Behavior in Energy and Environment. 
2 A more formal and detailed description of the model is given in Aune et al (2005). 
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Norwegian geographical areas, which are the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea.3 
FRISBEE has previously been used for studies of petroleum production (Lindholt and Glomsrød, 
2018), emission from shipping and petroleum activities in the Arctic (Peters et al, 2011) and impacts 
of petroleum industry restructuring (Aune et al, 2010). 
2.1. Production and investment 
For each of the 15 FRISBEE regions (r) there are 4 field categories. In addition, Greenland is one 
region with one field category (see Table A1 in Appendix A). The model separates between oil 
companies’ investment and production decisions in the 14 regions outside OPEC, which consist of (4 
x 13 + 1 =) 53 field categories, based on profit maximization and detailed information about the access 
to fields worldwide4. In each region, oil companies produce oil, which they sell on the global market 
and all trade between regions goes through a common pool. Regional supply, demand and trade flows 
are among the outputs of the model.  
 
Expected future price is based on history and is set equal to the average oil price during the previous 
six years. Price expectations are thus continuously updated along the simulated scenarios. Hence, I 
apply adaptive oil price expectations in the following way: 
 
(1)  𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑗] =
1
6
 ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑗,𝑡−𝑛
6−1
𝑛=0   
 
where 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑗] is the expected (real) oil price and 𝑃𝑃𝑗,𝑡 the actual oil price in year t in field group j. The 
oil price scenarios are from IEA (2017a). 
 
The model assumes that basic incentive for oil companies is to invest in provinces and field types with 
the highest expected return and apply the traditional NPV method, which Graham et al (2015) suggest 
is the predominant principle in investment decision. NPV are calculated for the 53 field categories, 
based on adaptive price expectations described above and a pre-specified required rate of return, which 
is set to 7, 10, 15 and 20 per cent in real terms. 
 
Neglecting footscript t for simplicity of exposition, investments in new reserves in Non-OPEC are 
derived from the following maximisation problem (see Appendix B for details): 
                                                     
3 I ignore Lofoten/Vesterålen/Senja as this area at present is closed for petroleum activity. 
4 For this modelling work I have benefited from access to the comprehensive IHS Energy field database, see  www.ihs.com. 
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(2)  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑅𝑗𝜋
𝑒{𝑅𝑗, 𝐸[𝑃𝑗], 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗, 𝐶𝑂𝑗, 𝐶𝐶𝑗(𝑅𝑗, 𝑈𝑅𝑗), 𝐺𝑇𝑗, 𝑁𝑇𝑗, 𝑇𝐷𝑗, 𝐹𝑗} 
 
where 𝜋𝑒 is expected discounted profits, 𝑅𝑗 denotes investment in new reserves (new fields and 
reserve growth in existing fields) in field group j, 𝐸[𝑃𝑗] is expected (real) price which is equal over the 
field groups j, RRRj  is the required rate of return which is also equal over field groups, 𝐶𝑂𝑗 and  𝐶𝐶𝑗 is 
operating and capital costs, respectively, jGT  and jNT  gross and net tax rates on oil production, 
respectively, and 𝑇𝐷𝑗 is tax deductions which in Norway are depreciation, uplift and interest expenses 
(se Section 2.3 for further elaboration on this). jF  is a vector of field characteristics that differ across 
field groups (notably decline rates and time lags). Note that capital costs are convex in the short term. 
This may reflect capacity constraints in the short run as e.g. shortage on the availability of oilrigs, 
personnel etc. Further, marginal capital costs increase in investment activity (Rj) and when the pool of 
undeveloped reserves available for new reserve investment declines ( jUR ). In this manner the 
exhaustibility constraint partly reflects that the scarcity rent is higher the less undeveloped resources 
there are. The investment cost function also takes into consideration that large current production 
modifies the rising trend in field development costs because of economies of scale, and that a large 
regional activity level modifies the rising trend in development costs. These factors make it more 
attractive to stay in an area rather than entering new locations with a lower degree of reserve 
development. Data on reserves (both producing, developed and undeveloped) and operational and 
capital costs are based on the extensive database of global petroleum reserves in the year 2012.5 The 
parameters in the cost function are based on these available cost data. 
 
I derive gross and net tax rates for each country by data from EY (2015), Kallas (2016) and Wood 
Mackenzie (2016). When I estimate the average tax rates for a region which consists of various 
countries, I apply each country’s share of the regional production as weights. As will be clear later, the 
general level of taxes in other oil provinces than Norway is only of importance when the oil companies 
are constrained by credit and cannot invest in all projects they find profitable. 
 
A simpler approach is applied for exploration investments. The model assumes that the process for 
discovered reserves 𝑅𝐸𝑗 is a function of the expected oil price, remaining undiscovered reserves in 
                                                     
5 The initial regional costs from IHS have been updated with data on break-even prices from Rystad Energy, see 
http://www.rystadenergy.com/. 
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each region and the RRR, and captured by the following function (cf. Appendix B), and footscript t is 
still subdued: 
 
(3)  𝑅𝐸𝑗 = 𝑅𝐸𝑗(𝐸[𝑃𝑗], 𝑈𝑗 , 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗, 𝐹𝑗) 
 
where 𝑈𝑗denotes (expected) remaining undiscovered reserves. A lower expected price and/or a higher 
RRRj will decrease the level of discoveries. When new fields are developed, the stock of undeveloped 
reserves is reduced. New discoveries add to the stock of undeveloped reserves at the end of each year 
in every region and field category (see Appendix B for details). Expected undiscovered oil reserves are 
mainly based on USGS (2000, 2008, 2012) as well as Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2016, 2017). 
 
For developed Non-OPEC fields the model assumes that oil supply is determined by equalizing the 
producer price of oil with the sum of the marginal operating cost and the gross sales taxes in each field 
category. The producer price of oil in a region is mainly determined by the global crude oil price and 
transport costs, but may also differ because of crude oil quality. We have for region r and field group j 
at time t: 
 
(4)  𝐶𝑂𝑗
𝑟 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟(1 − 𝐺𝑇𝑟)   if 𝑆𝑗 > 0 
 
where 𝐶𝑂𝑗
𝑟is the marginal operating costs in field group j in region r, PPr is the producer price in 
region r, which is considered exogenously by the Non-OPEC producers. GTr is the gross tax in region 
r, but for Norway and other regions without gross taxes6, marginal operating costs simply equal the oil 
price. Sj is production in field group j. Operating costs are increasing functions of production, but are 
generally low unless production is close to the fields’ production capacity; then they increase rapidly. 
The parameters in the cost function are based on available cost data. 
 
In summary, oil companies invest in the development of new reserves, which is the sum of investment 
in new fields and in efforts to increase oil recovery from producing fields. As Non-OPEC production 
is profit-driven, a higher oil price path (compared to a reference path) will gradually increase Non-
OPEC supply. Extraction from existing capacities (Eq. 4) is fairly fixed, but investing in new reserves 
                                                     
6 I disregard area fees and CO2-taxes, which in 2018 are estimated to constitute 3 per cent of total taxes on the NCS 
(Norwegian Petroleum, 2018a). 
11 
(Eq. 2) will in the medium to long term lead to more fields being developed. In the longer term new 
fields are discovered and appraised for development (Eq. 3). 
 
The oil and gas companies only invest in projects with a RRR above or at the pre-specified level. The 
assumption that investments first target the most profitable reserves leads to a geographical spread of 
extraction. Gradually, reserves that are costlier to extract become candidates for investment, and the 
cost of development will rise as reserves are depleted. On the other hand, new discoveries add to the 
pool of undeveloped reserves. 
 
FRISBEE operates with constraints on the scale of investments to modify the dynamic effect in 
periods with high profits. Reinvestment of a certain share of the cash flow into the oil industry varies 
over time, and it is difficult to get hold of reliable and updated estimates of this share. In an earlier 
study OGJ (2001) claims that the oil industry historically had reinvested a remarkably consistent 60 
per cent of cash flow (includes expenditures on exploration). Hence, I limit total expenditure on 
capital to 50 per cent of total cash flow in the oil industry (as the model does not include exploration 
costs). The cash flow constraint is generally not binding in the various scenario, and lower levels of 
constraints are tested in the sensitivity analyses. 
2.2. Demand 
The model distinguishes between three end-users of oil products, i.e., industry, households (including 
services) and power producers. Industries and households consume both transport oil and stationary oil 
(including processing), whereas power producers consume fuel oil. The regional end-user prices are 
the sum of producer price, transport, distribution and marketing costs, VAT and a carbon tax, and are 
mainly taken from IEA (2012a), IEA (2012b) and GIZ (2013). Demand from the final end-users is 
log-linear functions of price, population, GDP per capita and autonomous energy efficiency 
improvements (AEEI). The per capita income elasticities vary between 0.1 and 1.1 in the long run 
(weighted averages are around 0.6 for both households and industries). The long-run direct price 
elasticity varies between -0.1 and -0.6 with a weighted average of -0.30 for households and -0.21 for 
industries. The elasticities are mainly taken from Liu (2004), IEA (2007), Tsirimokos (2011) and 
Burke and Yang (2016). Demand for fuel oil from power producers is simply set fixed and constant 
over time (IEA, 2017a). 
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2.3. The Norwegian tax take 
Petroleum is important to the Norwegian economy. In 2012 the gross product of oil and gas extraction 
in Norway amounted to nearly 25 per cent of GDP of which 67 per cent was resource rent (Cappelen 
et al, 2013). Following the drop in oil prices in 2014, the gross product of oil and gas extraction was 
down to 14 per cent of GDP in 2017 (Ministry of Finance, 2018). Almost all the oil and gas produced 
on the NCS is exported, and the present export value of oil is marginally higher than for gas. 
 
One of the overall principles of Norway’s management of its petroleum resources is that it shall lead 
to maximum value creation. Since the resources belong to society as a whole, the Norwegian state 
secures a large share of the value creation through taxation (Norwegian Petroleum, 2018a). In 2018, 
Norway’s tax revenues from petroleum activities are estimated to about 105 billion NOK (Ministry of 
Finance, 2018). This amounts to 47 per cent of the government’s total income from the petroleum 
sector. The contribution to total petroleum income from the State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) will 
be around 44 per cent and dividends of the state oil company Equinor (former Statoil) around 6 per 
cent. The remaining 3 per cent of the petroleum income comes from environmental taxes and area 
fees. Further, it is estimated that approximately 19 per cent of total state revenues will come from the 
oil and gas sector in 2018. 
 
According to Norwegian Petroleum (2018b) taxation in Norway in period t consists of an ordinary 
corporate tax NTC of 23 per cent which is levied on revenue less operating costs, capital allowances 
and interest expenses over field groups j in Norway. Reintroducing footscrip t:        
 
        (5)   𝑁𝑇𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦,𝑡
𝐶 [∑ (𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦,𝑡 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑂𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼𝐸𝑗,𝑡)𝑗∈𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦 ] 
 
where PPNorway,t is the producer price in Norway at time t which is equal over field groups, Sj,t  is 
production in field group j at time t and COj,t is operating costs in the various field groups at time t. 
IEj,t is interest expenses in field group j on loans that finance the investment. Deduction of interest is 
restricted to a loan of 50 per cent of the remaining tax value of the offshore production factors. Hence, 
I assume that the oil companies borrow 50 per cent of their outlay on capital each year. In the actual 
valuation of the financial costs the authorities apply the companiesʼ average interest rate paid on loans. 
I select an interest rate of 3.5 per cent in the calculations as is also done by the Ministry of Finance 
(2013). Dj,t  is the depreciation of capital costs (CCj,t) in field group j at time t, which is made linearly 
over six years in Norway. 
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      (6)     𝐷𝑗,𝑡 =
1
6
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑗,𝑡−𝑛
6−1
𝑛=0  
 
A Special Petroleum Tax NTS of 55 per cent is applied to the offshore oil industry and is levied on the 
same amount as the corporate tax except for an extra capital allowance: 
 
      (7)   𝑁𝑇𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦,𝑡
𝑆 [∑ (𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦,𝑡 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑂𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼𝐸𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑈𝑃𝑗,𝑡)𝑗∈𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦 ] 
 
where UPj,t  is a 21.2 per cent uplift on capital investment (CCj,t), which is treated as a 4-year straight-
line depreciation (5.3 per cent per year).  
 
      (8)     𝑈𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =
1
4
∑ 0.212𝐶𝐶𝑗,𝑡−𝑛
4−1
𝑛=0  
 
I refer to the expression in Eq. (5) and (7) between the brackets as the tax base. Total tax take TAXt in 
year t is the sum of Eq. (5) and (7). The NPV of the tax take is: 
 
        (9) 𝑇𝐴𝑋 = ∑
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡
(1+𝑑)𝑡𝑡
  
       
where d is the government’s discount rate, which is set to 4 per cent. I follow the Ministry of Finance 
(2014) which states that the risk-adjusted discount rate should be at this level in socioeconomic 
analyses. However, I also derive the results with a 7 per cent rate which is used by the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that both changes in production (through gross income) and investment 
(through deductions of capital depreciation, uplift and interest expenses) affect the tax take, c.f. Eq. (5) 
and (7). Lower investments for a period, ceteribus paribus, mean lower deductions and a higher tax 
base and tax take. Further, lower investments will eventually lead to lower production and this drives 
down the future gross income which is taxed by the government. These two opposing effects are 
central in this study. 
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3. The Norwegian oil market towards 2050  
I assume that changes in petroleum prices and RRR imply changes in production and investment as 
from 2018. Keeping the rules governing depreciation, uplift and interest payment allowances constant, 
I derive the tax take of the Norwegian government each year, and calculate the discounted tax take 
over the 2018-2050 period.  
3.1. Oil price scenarios 
The supply of oil is calculated for three price trajectories. I first develop a reference oil price scenario 
based on the New Policy Scenario of IEA (2017a). Figure 1 shows that the real oil price (2012-USD) 
is expected to increase to 77 USD per barrel in 2025 before rising to reach 102 USD in 2040.7  As I 
study the effects until 2050, I simply keep the oil price constant after 2040. In addition to the reference 
scenario, IEA considers a low oil price scenario, where the oil price reaches 58 USD per barrel in 
2040.8 Such a development relates to rapid growth of electricity use in transport as well as increased 
OPEC production and higher supply of light tight oil in the US and other regions. However, continued 
high economic growth in large developing economies combined with higher decline rates at existing 
fields and the need to gradually move to less productive provinces might sustain a high oil price. This 
is the background of the Current Policy Scenario, where oil prices reach 125 USD per boe in 2040.  
 
Figure 1.  Oil price assumptions. USD (2012-prices)/boe. 
 
                                                     
7 The oil price in 2018 of 50 USD per barrel in 2012-prices corresponds to around 60 USD in 2018-prices. This might deviate 
from the present price level, but the study focuses on long-term prices and not short-term fluctuations. 
8 This corresponds to an oil price of around 70 USD in 2018-prices. 
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When the real price of oil is increasing, the assumption of adaptive expectations will lead investors 
into a rising expected price path that is lagging somewhat behind the real price development.  
3.2. Production, investment and tax revenue 
Figure 2 shows Norwegian oil production towards 2050 with a RRR of 7 per cent in the reference oil 
price scenario. The production level fits relatively closely the true development up to 2018. We see 
that production increases from around 2020 in the North Sea and this is consistent with projections 
from Norwegian Petroleum (2018c). The reason is the start-up of the giant oil field Johan Sverdrup. 
However, as from around 2026 both North Sea production and total supply decline steadily over the 
projection period. In 2050 the production level in the North Sea is one quarter of the level in 2018. 
Production in the Norwegian Sea is almost constant before it starts to decline from around 2027. At 
the end of the period production in this region is one-third of the present level. Production in the 
Barents Sea increases slightly up to the mid-30s and then remains more or less constant. Remember 
that behind such a constant supply level many fields are emptied and new fields come into production. 
Aker BP (2018) estimates that total Norwegian oil and gas production is down 50 per cent in 2040 
from 2018. In comparison, I find that total oil supply shows a reduction of 40 per cent in 2040 
compared to the present level. 
 
Figure 2.   Projections of Norwegian supplies towards 2050 in various regions. Reference oil 
price scenario and a rate of return of 7 per cent. 
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From now on I call the scenario with a RRR of 7 per cent the reference return scenario. Figure 3 
shows that when we move from the reference return scenario to a situation with a RRR of 10 per cent, 
production is lower up to 2032. From then on extraction is higher in the 10 per cent scenario. This may 
be somewhat surprising at first glance. To explain this, we start by looking at Figure 4 which shows 
that in the reference return scenario investments in new reserves generally are on a declining trend, 
except for an increase in 2022 when a relatively larger amount of reserves is developed. Thereafter 
investment declines over the projection period. Since investments first target the most profitable 
reserves, introducing a higher RRR means that it is optimal to reduce investments, because more of the 
high cost reserves become unprofitable to develop. In the 10 per cent scenario investments are lower 
than in the reference scenario initially, but they are higher as from 2023. The reason is that lower 
investments in an initial period entail lower future capital costs, both because of reduced investment 
activity in itself and also because the pool of undeveloped reserves decline more slowly (cf. the 
discussion following the introduction of Eq. 2). This means that it will be profitable to invest in these 
fields at a later stage. Investments decline in the 10 per cent scenario as from 2025, but are higher than 
in the reference return case over the rest of the projection period. Due to long lead times from 
investment to actual extraction, this explains why production is higher after 2032 in the 10 per cent 
case compared to the reference return scenario (see Figure 3). This pattern repeats itself moving to the 
15 and to the 20 per cent scenario. Oil companies reduce initial investments to a larger extent and for a 
longer period when the RRR rises compared to the preceding level. Again, this drives down the capital 
costs and makes it profitable to invest in these reserves at a later stage. Because of this extraction is 
higher as from 2038 with RRR of 15 per cent than in the reference return case. Likewise, after 2042 
production is higher with a RRR of 20 per cent compared to the reference scenario. 
 
We see that even if the increasing oil price has a positive impact on new discoveries as described in 
Eq. (3), adding continously to the stock of undeveloped reserves, total oil production declines as from 
around 2026 independent of the level of the RRR. The reason why production declines can be 
illustrated by the ratio between investments in new reserves and the production level (in mtoe). A ratio 
above one means that the extracted reserves are more than replaced by added (developed) reserves. 
Comparing Figure 3 and 4 we see that the ratio is less than one in all scenarios, which explains the 
significant contraction in supply after 2025. 
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Figure 3.   Projection of supply on the Norwegian continental shelf towards 2050 with a refer-
ence oil price scenario and with various rates of return. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Investment in new reserves towards 2050 with a reference oil price scenario and with 
various rates of return. 
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deductions of capital depreciation, uplift and interest expenses) affect the tax take, c.f. Eq. (5) and (7). 
Figure 5 shows the effect of increased RRR on the tax take in the reference oil price scenario.  
 
Figure 5.  Tax take towards 2050 with a reference oil price scenario and with various rates of re-
turn. 
 
 
We can differ between three stages. In an initial stage moving to a higher RRR only to a small extent 
lowers production up to around 2025 as shown in Figure 3, and therefore the negative effect from 
lower production on the tax take in this period is relatively small. The reason why the tax take is 
higher in this initial stage when RRR rises as Figure 5 shows, is that investments are lower and this 
leads to smaller depreciation, uplift and interest payments allowances, which in turn increase the tax 
base in Eq. (5) and (7).9 As production only gradually declines due to long lead times, it takes time for 
this negative effect to dominate the investment effect and force the tax take down. In the second stage 
Figure 5 shows that both reduced production and increased investment have a negative effect on the 
tax take, and the effect is stronger as RRR rises. The postponement of investment is the reason why 
production eventually becomes higher when there is an increase in RRR, and the various tax take 
scenarios approach each other at this third stage towards the end of the projection period. 
 
                                                     
9 Higher RRR will lead to both lower investments and lower discoveries, which is shown by Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). However, 
exploration costs are not included in the model. These costs are deductible in full in Norway, as opposed to other capital 
outlays which are activated and written-off. Including exploration costs would probably strengthen the increase in tax take. 
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In summary, in all RRR scenarios the initial positive effects of reduced investment on the tax take are 
offset by the later negative effect of reduced production. Because of this the NPV of the tax take only 
changes marginally when we move to a scenario with a higher RRR. Table 1 shows that the change in 
NPV of the tax take from the reference scenario is +3, +1 and -3 per cent in the 10, 15 and 20 per cent 
scenarios, respectively. We also see that with a reference oil price and a RRR of 7 per cent the NPV of 
the tax take is 353 billion USD with a government discount rate of 4 per cent.10 If we apply a discount 
rate of 7 per cent, the NPV of the tax take is down one-third to 235 billion USD. When RRR rises the 
relative change in the NPV of the tax take is now slightly more positive than with a 4 per cent discount 
rate as it increases by +3, +4 and +4 per cent in the 10, 15 and 20 per cent scenarios, respectively. The 
reason is that the positive initial tax effect of lower investments weighs more with higher RRR. 
 
With a high oil price the NPV of the tax take increases to 460 bn USD, 30 per cent above the reference 
scenario. Higher prices lead to more discoveries as shown in Eq. (3), which subsequently can be 
developed and extracted. A higher price also leads to increased investments because more of the high 
cost fields become profitable to develop, c.f. Eq. (2). However, following an initial period of 
increasing investments they gradually start to fall significantly, similar to the pattern in Figure 4, 
despite new discoveries. As with the reference oil price, we experience declining production after 
around 2025-26. Likewise, for an initial period lower investments result in a larger tax take when RRR 
rises. In addition, lower investments lead to both lower production and tax take only gradually. As in 
the reference scenario, the result is marginally changes in the NPV of tax take over various RRR as is 
shown in Table 1. If we apply a discount rate of 7 per cent the NPV of the tax take is again down with 
around one-third. As with the reference oil price, when RRR rises the relative change in the NPV of 
the tax take is now slightly more positive than with a 4 per cent discount rate. 
 
With a low oil price the NPV of the tax take is 114 bn USD, one third of the value in the reference 
case. Lower prices lead to less discoveries which subsequently means less resources are being 
developed and extracted. When the oil price is low variations in the RRR have larger and more lasting 
effect on production somewhat earlier on than with a reference oil price. Firstly, higher RRR has a 
larger and more persistent impact on the investments. The reason is that because the capital cost 
function of new reserves is convex, we are on the flatter part of the cost curve when the oil price is 
                                                     
10 In comparison the Government Pension Fund in 2018 amounts to around 1070 billion USD, when we include revenue from 
both oil and gas. To put this in further perspective, it can be assumed that the NPV of the tax take from natural gas comes to 
the same amount as oil (around 350 bn USD). The other important component of the governmentʼs net cash flow from 
petroleum, mainly SDFI, is in 2018 estimated to be roughly equal to the total income from oil and gas. If the SDFI and other 
components develop in tandem with the future oil and gas income, total NPV of future revenue from the oil and gas sector is 
around 1400 bn USD, 40 per cent above the present value of the Pension Fund. 
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low, i.e. variations in the RRR have a stronger effect on the investment volume (and on production 
with a lag). Further, as the oil price is more or less constant, production gradually declines relatively 
more with higher RRR than in the reference oil price case when the price is increasing. However, 
because of discounting, the positive effects on the tax take from much lower investments earlier on 
weigh stronger than the somewhat later negative effect of reduced production. The result is that the tax 
take now increases more and for an extended period initially when RRR rises. Table 1 shows that 
when we move from a situation with a RRR of 7 per cent, the increase in NPV of the tax take is +18, 
+19 and +42 per cent in the scenarios with a RRR of 10, 15 and 20 per cent, respectively. With a 7 per 
cent governmental discount rate, the relative change in the NPV of the tax take is even more positive 
when RRR rises than with a 4 per cent discount rate. The NPV of total tax revenue marginally as the 
relative increase now is +24, +37 and +63 per cent. The reason is that the positive initial tax effect of 
lower investments weighs more with a higher RRR due to a higher governmental discount rate. 
 
Table 1.    Net present value of tax take. Billion USD when the rate of return is 7 per cent. Devia-
tion from the 7 per cent return case with various oil prices and various returns.  
 Required rate of return 
                7 per cent     10 per cent               15 per cent               20 per cent 
                          Change from 7 per cent 
High oil price 460 bn USD          0 %                  1 %                 -3 % 
Reference oil price 353 bn USD          3 %                 1 %                 -3 % 
Low oil price 114 bn USD        18 %               19 %                 42 % 
4. Sensitivity analyses  
The results are influenced by the length of the lead times, of which one part is the time lapse from 
when a development decision is made to actual production starts. In the model the lead time in each 
field group is based on existing data. However, future lead times can probably be reduced with simpler 
and more standardized developments (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2011). However, a priori it is 
impossible to say how this may affect the results. With shorter lead times the reduction in initial 
investments will lead to a more rapid response of lower production, which will have a negative effect 
on total tax revenue earlier on. However, the effect of the higher investments after the initial period is 
a faster increase in production and tax revenue which counteracts the initial negative tax effect. 
 
Assumptions regarding costs are quite uncertain. The costs have declined over the last years 
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018), and we may see further cost reductions in the future. 
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Hence, I have tested the effects of lower operating and capital costs on the NCS. I carry out the cost 
sensitivity analyses in the reference oil price scenario with a cash flow constraint of 50 per cent. First, 
I reduce the capital costs by 20 per cent. The increase in NPV of total tax revenue compared to the 
situation with original capital costs is around 10-12 per cent over the various RRR scenarios. Lower 
capital costs lead to somewhat higher investment over the whole period and lift the production profile 
upwards. However, moving to higher RRR levels has by and large the same effects as with the original 
costs. Compared to the 7 per cent case, higher RRR leads to changes in the NPV of total tax revenue 
with +2, 0 and -5 per cent in the scenarios with a RRR of 10, 15 and 20 per cent, respectively. In a 
situation with 20 per cent lower production costs, we get a relative change in the total tax revenue in 
the same magnitude as with a lower capital costs. 
 
Following the fall in oil prices since 2014, oil companies cut investment budgets in response to a dra-
matic reduction in cash flow. Some argue that since companies prefer to fund a considerable part of 
new investment from their cash flow, they therefore cut capital spending. Further, they may be reluc-
tant to cut back on dividends promised to shareholders, and be careful not to increase debt levels to 
much due to credit rating concerns and fear of financial stress (Osmundsen et al, 2017). As I apply a 
global model with oil producer taxes in different regions, I can take account of a possible tax competi-
tion between the different provinces. In the analysis (static) tax competition can only manifest itself if 
oil companies cannot invest in all projects with an internal rate of return of at least the prevailing 
RRR. So far I have applied a 50 per cent cash flow constraint and this is not binding for any year in 
the reference oil price scenario, which means that the oil companies can invest in all oil fields they 
find interesting. However, if the oil and gas companies limit their investments to 30 per cent of cash 
flow in the reference oil price scenario, the cash flow constraint is binding for some or all of the years 
in the 2018-2050 period. Then the companies may redirect their investments from the NCS to other 
provinces with lower costs and more profitable investment environment. However, this effect is some-
what dampened by the cost function modelling which makes it more attractive to stay in an area where 
the company already has production rather than entering new areas. However, the results show that 
with a 30 per cent constraint Norwegian production and investment decline faster compared to the 
non-binding situation, leading to a lower tax take in each RRR scenario. The reduction in NPV of total 
tax revenue from the situation with no cash flow constraint is around 10-15 per cent over the various 
RRR scenarios. However, the relative effects of higher RRR are similar as in the non-binding case. 
Again, a rise in RRR gradually leads to reductions in production. As the effects of reduced invest-
ments initially on one side and gradually lower production on the other offset each other, the result is 
marginal changes in NPV of tax revenue as in the reference oil price scenario without cash flow 
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constraint. Compared to the 7 per cent case, higher RRR increases the NPV of the tax take by +1, +2 
and +2 per cent in the scenarios with a RRR of 10, 15 and 20 per cent, respectively. 
 
When RRR rises, total Non-OPEC production declines. Because the oil price is exogenous in the 
model, OPEC increases their production correspondingly. In reality OPEC might not offset the reduc-
tion in production completely, and this would lead to higher oil prices. Due to this price effect, a rise 
in RRR could lead to even higher tax take compared to the situation with an exogenous oil price. 
 
This study has not modelled uncertainty in an explicit way. However, by changing RRR and prices I 
have studied potential upside and downside scenarios alongside the reference case. Further, the oil 
companies are in a way cautious as the modelling of the cost functions imply that it is somewhat more 
profitable for companies to hold on to provinces where they already have exploration and production 
activities, rather than plunging into new ones. In addition, companies can be said to behave more cau-
tiously when RRR rises, as they demand higher returns due to more risky investments. However, a fu-
ture research task could be to implement uncertainty explicitly into the oil companyʼs investment deci-
sions, e.g. into the expected oil price function in Eq. (2). 
5. Conclusions 
For various reasons the required rate of return for the oil companies may be higher today and in the 
future, than only some years ago. Because of lower oil prices, many oil majors have moved to lower-
cost areas where resources can be brought on relatively quickly. This could mean less interest in 
relatively high cost areas with long lead times like the Norwegian continental shelf. There may also 
have been a shift from volume to value, i.e. the increasing focus by companies on projects that deliver 
high rates of return rather than high reserve volumes. In addition, companies may have become 
increasingly anxious that their assets could become “stranded”, or worthless, if governments across the 
world introduce stricter rules to tackle global warming. This can lead to more near-sighted investment 
strategies and hence, a higher required rate of return. 
 
By applying various required rates of return as well as various oil prices, I derive future Norwegian oil 
production, investment and tax payment during the 2018-2050 period by using a partial equilibrium 
model for the global oil market. A central feature of the Norwegian tax system, among others, is that 
the government in practice carries a large fraction of the oil companiesʼ investments, because of a high 
net tax rate and favourable possibilities for deductions of capital expenses. An important consequence 
of this is that lower investments over a period will increase the tax take. 
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I show that rising required rate of return generally will lead to small variations in the net present value 
of total tax revenue. The main reason is that when return rises, less of the high cost reserves become 
profitable to develop and investment declines for an initial period. However, declining investments 
mean lower capital outlay and hence lower tax deductions, which in turn increase the tax base and the 
tax income. Lower investments have a negative effect on future production with a time lag due to long 
lead times. On the other hand, due to reduced initial capital costs the oil companies postpone invest-
ments to later periods and without this effect future production would have fallen even more. Although 
lower production gradually has a negative effect on tax revenue, this is offset by the positive effect on 
revenue from lower investment initially.  
 
I show that with a relatively low oil price, higher required rates of return are beneficial for the govern-
ment. As the required rate becomes higher, tax revenue increases significantly. The reason is that the 
initial positive effect of reduced investment outweighs the negative effect from lower production later 
on. The results are supported by sensitivity analyses. 
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Table A1. List of oil regions and field categories in the FRISBEE model 
 
Oil field category 
1 2 3 4 
Africa 
Onshore 
 
Offshore deep 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore shallow 
 
Canada 
Arctic 
 
Non-Arctic conv. 
 
Unconventional   
Open Pit 
Unconventional    
In Situ 
Caspian region 
Onshore 
< 400 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
> 400 Mboe 
China 
Onshore 
< 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
>100; < 1000 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 1000 Mboe 
Offshore 
Eastern Europe 
Onshore 
< 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore 
< 100 Mboe 
Offshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Greenland All    
Latin America 
Onshore 
 
Offshore deep 
< 1000 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
> 1000 Mboe 
Offshore shallow 
Norway 
Arctic Barents Arctic Lo-Ve-Se Arctic Norwegian 
Sea 
Non-Arctic  
OECD Pacific 
Onshore 
 
Offshore deep Offshore shallow 
< 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow 
> 100 Mboe 
OPEC Core 
Onshore             
< 400 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400; < 1000 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 1000 Mboe 
Offshore 
 
Rest of Asia 
Onshore 
< 400 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
> 400 Mboe 
OPEC Rest 
Onshore 
< 400 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
 
Offshore shallow 
Russia 
Non-Arctic 
Onshore & 
Offshore 
Arctic offshore East Arctic Onshore West Arctic 
Onshore 
USA 
Non-Arctic 
Onshore 
Alaska 
 
Non-Arctic Offshore 
deep 
Non-Arctic 
Offshore shallow 
Western Europe 
Offshore deep 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore shallow + 
Onshore 
< 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow  
> 100 Mboe 
United Kingdom 
Offshore deep 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore shallow 
< 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow  
> 100 Mboe 
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Following Eq. (3), the expanded specification of discoveries (REj) is given by (reintroducing footscript 
t): 
 
      (𝐵1)  𝑅𝐸𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑅𝐸𝑗,𝑡(𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑗], 𝑈𝑗,𝑡, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗,𝑡) = 𝛼𝐸𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑗]
0.5
𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝑒
−𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗,𝑡(𝑡0𝑗+2/3𝑡1𝑗), 
 
where 𝑡0 is the length between exploration and the actual development decision, 𝑡1 is the investment 
phase and 𝛼𝐸𝑗,𝑡is a calibrated parameter. See Aune et al (2010) for a more thorough description of the 
discovery function. Undiscovered reserves are based on USGS (2000, 2008, 2012) and the figures for 
Norway are based on Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2016, 2017). 
 
A more detailed outline of the modelling of investment behaviour for Non-OPEC producers is 
presented below. For the complete formal structure of FRISBEE, see Aune et al (2005). With access to 
all Non-OPEC regions and field categories, oil companies maximise expected discounted profits from 
investments. Choice variable are given by reserve additions (Rj) from field development in the various 
field categories outside OPEC (see Table A1). It must be emphasized that when the oil companies 
invest, they know how the capacity profile and the amount of reserves in field group j are linked 
together, as well as how the operating and capital costs develop over the lifetime of the field. 
Expanding the profit function of Eq. (2), the present value of the oil companies’ expected profit from 
new reserve investment in field group j is (introducing footscript t): 
 
         (B2)  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝜋
𝑒(𝑅𝑗,𝑡 , 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑗], 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗,𝑡, 𝐶𝑂𝑗,𝑡, 𝐶𝐶𝑗,𝑡(𝑅𝑗.𝑡, 𝑈𝑅𝑗,𝑡), 𝐺𝑇𝑗,𝑡, 𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡, 𝑇𝐷𝑗,𝑡 , 𝐹𝑗,𝑡) =
∑ ⌊∑ [{(𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑗](1 − 𝐺𝑇𝑗,𝑡) − 𝐶𝑂𝑗,𝑡)(1 − 𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡) −
𝐶𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝑅𝑗,𝑡
+
𝐷𝑗,𝑡
𝑅𝐽,𝑡
𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡 +
𝑂𝐷𝑗,𝑡
𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡} 𝑅𝑗,𝑡]𝑗(𝑗) ⌋
1
(1+𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑡
𝑇𝑗
𝑡  
 
where 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑗] is the expected (real) oil price in field category j at time t, RRR is the required rate of 
return (discount rate), and 𝐶𝑂𝑗,𝑡and 𝐶𝐶𝑗,𝑡 are operating costs and capital costs in field category j at 
time t, respectively. GTj,t and NTj,t are gross and net tax rates on oil production,  𝐹𝑗,𝑡 is a vector of 
field-specific characteristics in field category j at time t and Tj is terminal year of production for field 
group j. Linear capital allowances, Dj,t , are made over a certain number of years. These deductions are 
made over six years in Norway11. ODj is other deductions of capital cost. In Norway these deductions 
                                                     
11 Depreciation over six years is the rule in Norway and seems to be a reasonable average period over different fiscal regimes.  
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are interest expenses on loans that finance the investments and a special uplift on capital expenses (see 
Section 2.3). 
 
The model defines the net cash flow (NCF) over all field groups j as revenues less current operating 
costs and total taxes. 
 
       (𝐵3)      𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡 = ∑ (𝑃𝑃𝑟,𝑡𝑆𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑂𝑗,𝑡
𝑟
𝑗∈𝐽 − 𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐺𝑇𝑗,𝑡) 
 
where TNT and TGT are total net and gross taxes paid, respectively. My starting point is that total 
expenditure on capital is limited to 50 per cent of net cash flow. Hence, the following restriction 
applies in the reference scenario:  
  
      (𝐵4)     ∑ [𝐶𝐶𝑗,𝑡]𝑗∈𝐽 ≤ 0.5𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡 
 
I emphasize that this cash flow constraint generally is not binding in the period 2012-2050. The model 
assumes that outside debt will not affect the cash flow, and this is true if interests and repayments on 
loans equal the loan amount each year12. Hence, the model only takes into consideration the effect of 
debt through interest payments, which is included in other deductions (OD) in Eq. (B2). It is assumed 
that the oil companies borrow 50 per cent of their outlay on capital. 
                                                     
12 Actually, the NPV of future interest and repayments on loan is equal to the loan amount each year. 
